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ABSTRACT
The Australian venture capital (VC) industry is young and relatively immature compared to
the United States. Even though the first Australian VC firm appeared in 1970, the industry
remained a niche with low levels of activity until the technology boom of the late 1990s saw
many new entrants and larger funds being raised. Unfortunately for the industry, it
experienced two major economic downturns just as it was beginning to take shape, hurting
industry performance and deterring investors. Since the global financial crisis, investment
activity has been on a continuous decline, raising concerns that the industry will continue to
decline at worst, or remain on a stagnant path at best, never reaching the critical mass to
flourish and achieve a meaningful role in Australia's economic growth.
Although recent economic events have impacted venture capital investing around the world,
Australia faces a number of local challenges that have left it struggling while countries like the
United States and the United Kingdom now make their recovery. In this study, we investigate
the idiosyncratic factors contributing to the challenged state of the Australian VC
industry-by looking at its recent history, performance, and participants-in the context of
government policies that have been implemented to support it. We identify industry
immaturity, poor track record of performance, gaps between research and commercialization,
and the structure of institutional investors as key issues facing the industry.
An understanding of the local challenges facing the venture capital industry is vital to
addressing them. Based on the challenges identified, we evaluate and recommend potential
remedies by taking a holistic view of the entrepreneurial ecosystem and the role of venture
capital within it-from the perspective of entrepreneurs, investors, research institutions, and
government.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Venture capital (VC) has been responsible for spawning some of the greatest companies in
the world today. Major corporations like Apple and Intel started from humble beginnings to
become international powerhouses. In Australia, venture capital has produced success stories like
Resmed, Cochlear, Hitwise, and SEEK. Australia has been the home of many great innovations
in its history, including the Google Maps platform, polymer bank notes, and the black box flight
recorder (Australian Geographic, 2010). Venture capital is seen by many as high risk investing
with the lure of astronomic gains, offering the opportunity to be a part of the next game changer
while providing an important source of portfolio diversification.
While Australia has evolved into a service economy, it relies a great deal on its production of
natural resources for exports and economic growth. The 'two-speed economy' is a frequently
used term to refer to the contrast between the fast-growing mining states and the more stagnant
non-mining states. By bridging the gap between innovation and commercialization, venture
capital can play an important role in the future prosperity of Australia as well as diversify the
nation's sources economic wealth.
The Australian venture capital industry is young and relatively immature compared to the
United States. Even though the first Australian VC firm appeared in 1970, the industry remained
a niche with very low levels of activity until the internet technology boom of the late 1990s saw
many new entrants and larger funds being raised. This is often regarded as when the industry
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really came to be. Around this time marked the formation of the industry's national association,
the Australian Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, Limited (AVCAL), and in 2002
the Australian Government formerly recognized the limited partnership structure governing
most venture capital and private equity firms. Unfortunately for the industry, the surge in fund
raising and investment activity ended quickly with the technology bust at the beginning of the
next decade, and would never return to these heights again.
1.1 Objectives
The venture capital industry has been in a constant struggle through its short history. In the past
15 years, there were only two periods when the industry began to pick up and attract investors.
Yet both periods were followed by major economic crashes, hurting industry performance and
deterring investors. Since the most recent downturn of the global financial crisis, investment
activity has been on a continuous decline. Industry players have expressed concern that the
industry will continue to decline at worst, or remain on a stagnant path at best, never reaching
the critical mass to flourish and achieve a meaningful role in Australia's economic growth.
However, the recent global economic recession impacted not only the venture capital industry,
but also many other industries in Australia-with perhaps the exception of its resources sector,
which remained relatively unscathed. Moreover, venture capital activity was dampened in other
countries of the world, including the United States. The first objective of this paper is to
determine the idiosyncratic factors contributing to the challenged state of the Australian venture
capital industry-by looking at its recent history, performance, and participants-in the context
of government policies that have been implemented to support it.
An understanding of the local challenges facing the venture capital industry is vital to addressing
them. The second objective of this paper is to evaluate and recommend potential remedies to
address these challenges, by taking a holistic view of the entrepreneurial ecosystem and the role of
venture capital within it-from the perspective of entrepreneurs, investors, research institutions,
and government.
16
1.2 Scope
This research excludes private equity investing, or mature and late stage investing, which includes
funds focused on buyouts, turnaround/distressed investing, generalist, mezzanine, secondaries,
and fund of funds. Our scope covers firms focused on seed state, early stage, and late stage ven-
ture capital. Angel investors are discussed, however public data is not available for this investor
type. They will be considered as separate to venture capital firms, since they are less formally
organized, have different investment approaches, and make much smaller investments.
1.3 Overview
Chapter 2 presents key background information on venture capital and private equity invest-
ing, including the fund stage focus, the limited partnership structure, and the life cycle of
a VC fund. It also discusses the sources of value for a VC firm that enables it to take the
high risk of investing in early stage companies.
Chapter 3 discusses the importance of a healthy environment of venture capital and en-
trepreneurship in the Australian economy. It outlines the strengths of the country that
make it suitable to support such an environment. The last section of this chapter explains
the data collection source and methodology used in this paper.
Chapter 4 provides a brief history of Australia's venture capital industry and looks at the
industry players and the recent investment performance. Key government initiatives to
support the industry are presented. The second half of this chapter discusses the unique
challenges now facing the industry.
Chapter 5 begins with an overview of the entrepreneurial ecosystem from the perspective of
the VC investor. Proposed remedies to the industry challenges are presented in the context
of this ecosystem, by looking at research institutions, entrepreneurs, institutional investors,
and government.
Chapter 6 contains the summary of findings and recomnmendations.
17
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Chapter 2
Background on Venture Capital and
Private Equity
Private equity (PE) refers to the asset class consisting of investments in private companies, that
is, companies that are not publicly listed and traded. Unlike publicly listed companies, private
companies are by comparison highly illiquid and also very opaque, exempt from the scrutiny
and regulatory requirements that public companies are subjected to. Private equity is generally
associated with high risk investing, stemming in part from the information asymmetries inherent
between investors and companies, and various other factors specific to the type of investment,
such as a startup company with no proven business, an early stage biotech company yet to
pass clinical trials, or a mature stage company under financial distress. For many companies,
their unique circumstances mean that private equity is the only source of capital available to
them. Private equity firms are willing to make these high risk investments by taking an active
management approach and seeking commensurately high returns for the risk and illiquidity
borne by investors.
19
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Figure 2.1: Spectrum of private equity investments.
2.1 Spectrum of investments
Private equity encompasses a broad spectrum of investing along various stages of a company's life
cycle. Venture capital is a sub-category of private equity, investing into the earlier stages of the
private equity spectrum-particularly seed and early stage companies-but is typically referred
to in a way that implies it is separate to private equity. Hence private equity is typically referred
to as investing into growth, expansion, and mature stage companies including buyouts and
restructuring deals. This distinction between the terms venture capital and private equity will
be maintained in this paper. Figure 2.1 depicts the broad categories in the spectrum, including a
short description of each category adapted from the yearbook glossary of the AVCAL. However,
it should be noted that in practice there is not always a clear junction between venture capital
and private equity. Large VC funds seeking to deploy capital can move further up the spectrum
of growth stage companies where they begin to overlap and complete with PE funds.
2.2 Partnership structure
Venture capital and private equity funds are structured as limited partnerships. Under this
structure, the general partner (GP) of the fund is responsible for the overall decision making
20
> Early Stage
and management of the fund's portfolio companies. The limited partner (LP) is the investor
who commits capital to the fund and cedes control of that capital to the GP. In many cases,
the GP also contributes capital to the fund as a means of incentive alignment and as a signaling
mechanism to its investors. The limited partnership structure allows LPs of the fund to maintain
limited liability from the activities of the fund's portfolio companies, so that there is no legal
recourse to the investors, since they are not involved with the day-to-day operations of these
companies.
Limited partnerships have a limited life time. VC funds normally have a life span of ten years,
after which the GP will have fully exited all portfolio investments and returned all capital,
including a hurdle rate of return, plus share of profits to its LPs. After this has occurred,
the partnership officially dissolves. It is in the GP's best interests to keep its LPs happy and
maintain strong relationships so that it can continue to raise capital from them in future funds.
Paramount to this is the fund's overall performance relative to a benchmark, measured by its
internal rate of return (IRR). A GP whose fund performs exceedingly well can attract capital
more easily later and raise potentially larger funds. Conversely, a GP whose fund has a lackluster
performance-or worse still, is loss making faces considerable difficulty attracting capital. It
will be shown in Chapter 4 that this has been one of the problems facing the venture capital
industry in Australia.
For their services to the LPs, GPs earn management fees and carried interest. Management fees
are typically charged at 2% of committed capital. In some instances, the fee might be charged
as a percentage of invested capital, which works out cheaper overall for the LPs since the fund
takes several years to become fully invested. Carried interest is the GP's share of profits, and is
typically 20%. This share is taken after all the original capital plus a predetermined hurdle rate
of return has been returned to investors. Clawback mechanisms ensure that LPs have a right to
be repaid by GPs in situations where early sharing of profits followed by inadequate subsequent
performances results in GPs having exceeded their share of carried interest. The profit sharing
arrangement helps to align GP incentives to maximize returns to its LPs. Established top tier
firms can charge more than the 2% management fee and 20% carried interest, while a new firm
without a track record may charge less than this when trying to attract capital to raise its first
21
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Figure 2.2: J-curve effect of private equity returns. (CalPERS, 2011)
fund. GPs may also charge fees to their portfolio companies, such as transaction and monitoring
fees.
2.3 Life cycle and returns
At the beginning of a fund's life cycle, GPs first need to raise capital from prospective LPs. An
LP agrees to commit a predetermined amount of capital to the fund, known as the committed
capital. The entire amount of committed capital is not always paid up front, but is called down
by the GP over the investment period. This benefits the both the LP, who does not have to part
with the entire amount of capital at once, and the GP, who does not want to diminish the fund's
IRR performance by holding uninvested capital. Once the fund has raised its target amount of
capital, it no longer accepts new capital commitments and the fund is said to be closed.
Venture capital and private equity funds exhibit a characteristic known as the 'J-curve effect',
shown in Figure 2.2, in reference to the fund's negative returns in its early years before breaking
even, and rapidly increasing once portfolio investments come to bear fruit. The early years
of a fund sees it actively searching, evaluating, and making investments into companies for its
portfolio. During this investing phase, committed capital is called down from the LPs. Once all
committed capital has been called down and invested, the fund is said to be fully invested, and
this typically happens by the fifth year. LPs are also subject to a lock-up period for the life of the
22
Sale through merger or acquisition to a strategic buyer.
Publicly listing the company on the stock market.
Sale to another venture capital or private equity fund.
Private placement with institutional investors.
Sale on the secondary market.
Liquidation or write-off.
Table 2.1: Common exit strategies used by VC and PE funds.
fund, meaning they cannot withdraw capital from the fund until that period has expired.
After making its investment in a portfolio company, the GP begins active oversight and man-
agement of the company. The type of intervention and degree of influence the GP exerts on the
company varies greatly, depending on factors like the VC firm's strategy, type of investment,
and the investee company. In any case, GPs have the opportunity here to deploy value-adding
capabilities to ensure their portfolio companies succeed. The goal is to see the equity value of the
company increase significantly, so that the GP can harvest that value by exiting the investment
and distributing profits to its LPs.
Since the IRR is a key measure of fund performance, the terms on which portfolio companies
are bought and sold are paramount to the fund, as is the timing of when those exits occur.
GPs must balance between earlier distribution of returns and optimum sale value, and often
have several alternatives when seeking to exit an investment.1 Interestingly, Gompers (1996)
showed evidence to support the notion of 'grandstanding', the tendency for younger VC firms
to exit their investments earlier, in an attempt to establish a reputation and prove their ability
to investors as quickly as possible. The cost of grandstanding is that the timing of these early
exists are sub-optimal, with underpriced valuations to achieve quick sales.
2.4 Value creation
Private equity and venture capital investing can offer a useful source of portfolio diversification
to investors. However, David Swensen, CIO of the Yale University endowment and a pioneer
of the endowment model of investing with its emphasis on alternative assets, argues that the
1GPs often have the choice of deciding between distributing cash or stock to their LPs. The factors influencing
this choice are an important topic, but outside the scope of this paper.
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extent of this diversification is limited, due to its fundamental links with the market. With the
seemingly generous fee structure, the question is how venture capital and private equity firms
create enough value for their LPs to make investing an attractive proposition. Listed below are
some of the most important sources of value creation.
e Sourcing of deals and conduct of due diligence on potential companies. Extensive networks
can provide a good referral pipeline and proprietary deal flow.3 These networks could
come from the entrepreneurial community, research sector, government, personal contacts,
banking and private sectors.
e Competence and ability of the investment management team to garner unique insights
into potential investments.
e Capability to add value to portfolio companies through areas such as business strategy,
provision of expertise, and mentoring.
e Leverage of investee companies to increase returns to equity. It should be noted that this
is only true for certain investment types (typically mature stage companies with stable
cash flows and a defensible market position), and is generally insufficient on its own to be
the primary source of value creation. Moreover, the recent financial crisis has seen a much
lower tolerance and reliance on leverage.
e Alignment of incentives with the entrepreneurs and managers.
o Ongoing management, monitoring, and support of portfolio companies.
e Finding and timing of optimal exit opportunities to harvest returns to LPs.
The relative importance of each source varies greatly with the stage of investing and the indi-
vidual firm's unique strengths and capabilities vis-i-vis its competitors. For example, leverage
provides little to no value for a VC firm focused on seed stage investments. Moreover, one
VC firm's primary source of value may be in its strong networks providing proprietary deal
flow, while for another VC firm it could be a highly capable team with strong experiences and
backgrounds pertaining to the firm's niche sector focus. It is interesting to note that VC firms
3 Proprietary deals are those where the firm has an exclusive opportunity to negotiate and invest without a
bidding process.
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in particular demonstrate strong persistence in returns, meaning that performance tends to be
correlated across time and thus top tier VC firms tend to keep performing well. Top tier firms
possess a sustainable competitive advantage with the reputation, track record, expertise, and
networks to continually attract the best entrepreneurs and the most desirable and sophisticated
investors.
25
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Chapter 3
The Importance of Venture Capital
in the Australian Economy
3.1 The lucky country
Australia is often referred to affectionately by its locals as 'the lucky country'. It is blessed with
an abundance of natural resources that have been a major source of its economic growth and
prosperity throughout its relatively short history since its colonialization by the British in 1788.
Its local climate made it ideal for farming merino sheep-originally brought in from Spain-and
the production of fine wool. From the 1820s, wool production began to play an increasingly
important role in economic growth, eventually making Australia the world's largest exporter of
wool. Discovery of gold in 1851 created the gold rush and brought in a surge of immigration,
leading gold to replace wool as the country's most valuable export until the 1870s. Even after
the rush, other mineral deposits continued to be discovered, including rich sources of silver, lead,
copper, and zinc. Agriculture has also played an important role in growth, with wheat becoming
a major export in the early 20th century. (Attard, 2010)
In the years since, Australia has been able to evolve into a service economy. Figure 3.1 shows
each industry's share of economic output in Australia over the past two decades. In the 2011
fiscal year, business and financial services were the two largest sectors by output, followed by
27
Industry Share of Output*
14 14
Other business services
12 12Retail and wholesale trade
10 10
8 8
6 6
mining
4 4
2 2
90/91 94/95 98/99 02/03 06107 10/11
Nominal gross value added
Includes: information media and tefecommunications. rental. hiring and real
estate services; professional scientific and technical services,
administgative and support services
Source: ABS
Figure 3.1: Industry share of output in Australia. (RBA, 2012)
the mining sector. The resources sector has continued to play a very significant role in driving
Australia's economy, even cushioning it from the effects of the global financial crisis. The
mining giant BHP Billiton is the largest listed company on the Australian Securities Exchange
(ASX), making up 9.23% of the entire All Ordinaries index alone (S&P, 2012). According to the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT, 2011), resources dominated export activity,
constituting eight of the nation's top ten exports. Major exports today include iron ore, coal,
gold, crude petroleum, natural gas, wheat, aluminum and copper. Services are the second major
export, with education and travel services being the third and fifth major exports respectively,
with Australia's geographic proximity making it an attractive education destination for millions
of international students in the Asia region. Figure 3.2 shows the top ten export volumes in the
2011 fiscal year.
Ironically, the "lucky country" phrase was first used by author David Horne, in his 1964 book
of the same name, as a criticism about the nation, when he wrote:
Australia is a lucky country, run by second-rate people who share its luck.
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Figure 3.2: Top ten Australian exports by value.
Horne felt that Australia was not a "clever country" like those that had been able to develop
through technological and other innovations, showing "less enterprise than almost any other
prosperous industrial society", and was simply a lucky country still able to rely on its abundance
of resources as it has done since its colonial beginnings (Australian Government, 2012). This
relates to a phenomenon in Australia known as the 'two-speed econonmy', which has been used
to refer to the recent boom in the resources sector creating a dual economy, leaving the non-
resources sectors stagnant while bearing the costs of higher interest rates, inflation, and exchange
rates due t~o the net positive economic growth. Carton (2008), however, argues that this is not
a recent phenomenon and that the nation has long been a two-speed economy, while pointing
out that there has been some positive spillover of wealth to other sectors.
3.2 The way forward
With the enormous role played by the resources sector in the Australian economy, the importance
of capitalizing on innovations and creating new businesses across sectors to secure Australia's
economic future and prosperity is well recognized. A thriving entrepreneurial environment and
healthy venture capital industry is key towards achieving this, by allowinig innovation t~o flourish
29
United States
United Kingdom
France
Germany
Spain
Australia
Canada
Netherlands
Korea
Sweden
Switzerland
Denmark
Italy
Finland
Belgium
Norway
Japan (2006)
Ireland
Poland
Portugal
Austria
Czech Republic
Luxembourg
Hungary
New Zealand
Greece
0.122%
.207%
0.091%
M 0.048%
0.095%
0.135%
S0.083%
0.148%
- 0.071%
0.211%
0.183%
- 0.298%
0 0.025%
* 0.225%
*0.111%
0.128%
0.007%
* 0.152%
3 0.026%
1 0.048%
0.036%
1 0.043%
0.291%
1 0.045%
h0.036%
I 0.007%
D 5000 10000 15000 20000
Venture capital investment (US$ million)
Figure 3.3: Venture capital investments (2008) in OECD nations. Each bar represents the total
investment, and the number beside each bar indicates the investment as a percentage of domestic
GDP.
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and by giving startup businesses access to the expertise and financial resources necessary to grow.
Australia possesses many comparative strengths that make it a most favorable environment for
this to occur.
" Well developed capital markets, institutions, and regulatory and legal frameworks.
" Political stability. In a report by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2009), Australia
was ranked as one of the most politically stable countries in the world, even more so than
the US, Singapore, and Germany.
" Financial stability. Australia has a AAA sovereign debt rating from the major ratings
agencies, and its major commercial banks are amongst the highest rated in the world.
" World class research capability in science and technology, with a strong education
system. In a study commissioned by the Australian Research Council in 2010, Australia's
research was found to be well above world standard in the areas of classical physics,
aerospace engineering, environmental technology, and industrial technology. It was also
found to be above world standard in the medical science areas of cardiovascular medicine
and hemotology, immunology, medical physiology, oncology and carcinogenesis. (ARC,
2010)
* Geographic proximity to Asia makes it easier to attract talent from these countries,
as well as conduct business and trade with some of the fastest growing countries in the
world.
" High quality of life. The United Nations' Human Development Index ranks Australia
as the second highest in the world (UNDP, 2011). The Economist Intelligence Unit's most
recent liveability world ranking placed four Australian cities in its top ten, with Melbourne
rated as the world's most liveable city (The Economist, 2011).
Although the level of venture capital investing in Australia lags far behind the United States
and the United Kingdom in absolute terms, it is generally on par with most developed countries
in relative terms. Figure 3.3 shows the most recent data on venture capital investment as a
proportion of GDP-also referred to as venture capital intensity among OECD countries, as
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captured by the OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2009 (OECD, 2009). The
data shows the US accounting for almost half of global venture capital investments representing
0.122% of its GDP. The UK follows second but by a large margin, with under 13% of global
investments representing 0.207% of its GDP. Australia's share of global investment is respectable
at just over 3%, about a quarter of the UK's total, and slightly above the average of OECD
countries excluding the US. Its venture capital intensity is 0.135%, which is approximately equal
to the OECD weighted average of 0.13%, and in fact slightly higher than the US. However,
it will be shown in Chapter 4 that ever since 2008, which is when the data in Figure 3.3 was
collected, the venture capital industry has suffered disproportionately more in Australia than in
the US, due in part to some the local challenges faced in the country.
3.3 Benefits of a strong venture capital industry
The benefits of a well-functioning venture capital industry go hand in hand with that of a
thriving entrepreneurial environment. Table 3.1 lists these key benefits. However, for most seed
stage and early stage companies without a proven business or revenues, accessing institutional
capital such as bank loans is not an option available to them. Venture capital is often the only
feasible option and can mean the difference between concept and reality. VC firms are willing to
make the high risk investment in the hopes of achieving commensurately high returns by:
1. Having an ability to find and identify the best investment opportunities.
2. Possessing insight into market and earnings potential to achieve a target rate of return.
3. Adding value to increase the likelihood of success by offering guidance and advice, providing
networking opportunities, bringing in outside expertise, adding credibility to the company,
and finding exit opportunities.
Venture capital thus plays a role beyond being a pure financial intermediary, and has been re-
sponsible in turning many startup ventures into some of Australia's most successful corporations,
including Pharmaxis, Cochlear and SEEK.
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Drive economic growth and diversify industry growth sources.
Creation of new businesses and jobs.
Attract foreign direct investment.
Attract skilled labor from overseas.
Provides a legitimate alternative asset class to institutional in-
vestors seeking higher returns and portfolio diversification.
Support scientific leadership in areas like medical science through
funding and commercialization. Those startups becoming suc-
cessful corporations can continue funding their own research and
development.
Table 3.1: Benefits of a strong venture capital industry.
3.4 Data collection and methodology
Key industry data on venture capital fund raising and investment activity was obtained through
the Thomson ONE private equity analytics platform, which incorporates the former Ventur-
eXpert database by Thomson Economics. For the purpose of this research, venture capi-
tal was defined to cover seed stage, early stage, and later stage VC. It excluded buyouts,
turnaround /distressed, generalist, mezzanine, secondaries, and fund of funds. Unfortunately,
the data required for historical performance of Australian VC funds was not available through
Thomson ONE. Instead we refer to the publicly available industry yearbooks published by
AVCAL, which offers indicative data, from which we are able to make some inferences on per-
formance in Chapter 4.
It is challenging to measure the precise level of Australian VC activity from its earliest years.
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) only began its survey of venture capital and private
equity in fiscal year 2000, but some of the data was not collected until 2005 (ABS, 2012). The
predecessor to AVCAL, the Australian Development Capital Association Limited (ADCAL) was
only formed in 1992 and marked the first time the industry became formally organized (AVCAL,
2009). AVCAL itself did not form until 1999, from which point it began publishing its annual
yearbook of industry data. This data must be interpreted with care, because until 2003, the term
'venture capital' was often used interchangeably to refer to all forms of private equity, including
late-stage buyouts. 1 The earliest fund raising captured in Thomson ONE is 1984, although there
'In fact. it was 2008 by the time AVCAL renamed itself from the Australian Venture Capital Association
Limited to the Australian Private Equity & Venture Capital Association Limited. though it chose to maintain its
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is a complete lapse in reported activity in the years 1990 to 1993 coinciding with the economic
recession at the time. This allows us to capture the trend beginning in the 1990s, when venture
capital really came to be as an industry, as marked by the formation of AVCAL.
Statistics on Australian research institutions and their commercialization programs were ob-
tained from the Australian Research Council (ARC) and the Department of Education, Science
and Training (DEST). Details on major government initiatives were obtained through Auslndus-
try. The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) provides regulatory specifics on venture capital tax
concessions, superannuation taxation rates, employee share schemes, and capital gains taxes-all
pertinent to our evaluation of incentives in Chapter 5.
already well-known acronym.
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Chapter 4
The Venture Capital Landscape in
Australia
4.1 A brief history
Venture capital is a relatively young industry in Australia. While the first modern VC firm
in the United States was founded in 1946,1 the first VC firm in Australia was founded in
1970 (Axiss Australia, 2002), when Bill Ferris, an MBA graduate and Baker Scholar from the
Harvard Business School, and Joe Strzynski, an economics graduate from the University of
Sydney (CHAMP Private Equity, 2012), formed International Venture Corporation. According
to AVCAL (2009), however, the global economic downturn as a result of the oil crisis "effectively
squashed the industry" in the 1970s. Furthermore, despite having started over four decades
ago, venture capital remained a niche for most of that period, and it was not until the internet
technology boom of the late 1990s did it take off as an industry, attracting mainstream attention
and seeing substantial capital inflows.
The bull market of the 1980s saw venture capital activity begin to increase somewhat. In 1984,
the Australian Government launched the Management and Investment Companies (MIC) pro-
'The firm was American Research and Development, an early stage investor in technologies being developed
for World War II. It was founded by Karl Compton, an 1\IT professor, Georges Doirot, an HBS professor, and
several Boston business leaders (Lerner et al., 2008).
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Figure 4.1: Number of VC firms formed by year, 1984-2011.
gram, which licensed 11 VC firms and allowed their limited partners to treat their entire capital
investments as tax deductions (Wan, 1988). In 1987, the Australian Securities Exchange was
formed after the unification of six separate and autonomous exchanges that resided across the
states (ASX Group, 2012), a positive factor in terms of exit opportunities for private equity.
However, the global economic recession at the end of this decade once again suppressed invest-
ment activity. Figure 4.1 shows the number of VC firms formed by year between 1984 and 2011,
based on all firms that raised new funds since 1986.
The market began its recovery in the early 1990s, and the second half of that decade saw an
unprecedented surge of activity coinciding with the technology bubble and the wave of optimism
as investors around the world jumped on the bandwagon to chase 'winning' companies with the
promise of double, triple, and even quadruple digit returns. The number of new funds raised
each year during this period and the total capital raised are represented by Figure 4.2. Fund
raising suddenly peaked at the end of the decade, with A$547 million raised by 12 funds in 1998.
Figure 4.1 captures the number of new VC firms peaking in 1999, which saw seven entrants that
year. What the chart does not capture is how many of these firms have since survived, and
Section 4.2.1 will look at the industry players still active today.
As Porter (2008) dlescribes in his ubiquitous model of competitive forces shapimng strategy, the
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Figure 4.2: New funds raised by fiscal year, 1986-2010.
opportunity to earn excess returns attracts aspiring new entrants which then drives down indus-
try profitability. The sudden influx of new VC players during the bubble crowded the market
and created intense competition for the best deals, further bidding up the valuation on com-
panies that were already overvalued, thus diminishing any possible returns. The A$547 million
of capital raised in 1998 was more than three times the amount raised in the previous year,
tapering off slowly before plunging after 2002. After the technology bust, fund raising activity
remained low again for several years, then rapidly increased during the bull market peak of
2006 and 2007, although it could not reach the heights of the technology bubble. In 2007, fund
raising peaked at A$432 million, only to plunge again the following year with the onset of the
global financial crisis. It will be shown in Section 4.2.3 that the industry has been struggling
ever since.
The general trend of venture capital fund raising over the past fifteen years has not been unique
to Australia. Indeed, the technology bubble of the late 1990s and the global financial crisis
in 2008 had significant impact on fund raising around the world, and Australia was simply no
exception. Figure 4.3 shows global fund raising activity between 1986 and 2011, in terms of total
funds raised and total number of funds raised each year. By far the highest peak of global fund
raising occurred in 2000, with A$154 billion raised by 892 funds around the world, although
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Figure 4.3: Global data for new funds raised by fiscal year, 1986-2010.
only 0.3% of this total was raised by Australian funds. The next peak in 2006 was far from the
heights of 2000, with A$47 billion raised by 256 funds around the world. By this time, however,
Australian funds raised 0.9% of this total, a significant increase in relative contribution that was
three times its level in 2000. This can also be observed in Figure 4.2, which shows the level of
fund raising in Australia just before the financial crisis being comparable to that seen in the late
1990s.
4.2 Present state of the venture capital industry
4.2.1 Industry players
Based on the combination of VC firm profiles from Thomson ONE and AVCAL's member
database, there were found to be 48 firms that manage seed, early, or late stage venture capital
funds in Australia. This excludes:
* Standalone in-house commercialization offices of academic research institutions, such as
Melbourne Ventures and New South Innovations, which belong to the University of Mel-
bourne and the University of New South Wales, respectively.
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Figure 4.4: Domestic VC firms headquartered by capital city.
* Another 15 firms which are now defunct according to Thomson ONE.
Table 4.1 shows the list of Australian VC firms. However, while still in existence, many of
these firms do not appear to be currently active. Therefore, those firms that have not raised
any venture capital funds within the past ten years2 are marked with an asterisk in the table.
Within the cohort of active firms stand a handful of the more prestigious and well-reputed firms
that have stood the test of time. These include Allen & Buckeridge, CHAMP Private Equity,
Southern Cross Ventures, and GBS Venture Partners. In addition, venture firms like Uniseed
and UniQuest are the result of collaborative efforts between several research institutions, the
Government, and the private sector. Figure 4.4 represents the geographic distribution of VC
firms, where it can be seen that Sydney, followed by Melbourne, are the major hubs of activity
in the country.3
Biotechnology represents the major investment focus of venture capital in Australia, as shown in
Figure 4.5, with over A$1.1 billion of cumulative investment in the sector. Other major invest-
ment focuses for venture capital are the computer software, internet, and medical sectors.
2 Since 2002.
3 Sydney and Melbourne also happen to be the two largest cities in Australia. with populations of 4.6 million
and 4.1 million respectively, out of a total population of 22.8 million (ABS, 2011). Sydney is the nation's financial
capital, while Melbourne is the leading hub in medical research.
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Accede Capital* Adventure Capital
African Lion Management Allen & Buckeridge
Andover Group ANU Connect Ventures
Australian Capital Ventures Blue Cove Ventures
Brandon Capital Partners CHAMP Ventures
Cleantech Ventures Coates Myer & Co.
Colonial First State Private Equity* CVC Managers*
DEXUS Property Group Fairgill Investments*
Farm Plan* Foundation Capital*
Four Hats Capital* GBS Venture Partners
Gresham Rabo management Incite Capital Management*
Innovation Capital Associates Intersuisse Bioscience Managers
Kestrel Capital* Latitude Investments*
LinQ Management Momentum Investment Group*
Neo Technology Ventures* OneVentures
Playford Capital* Pollenizer Ventures
Prometheus Equity Partners* Proto Investment Partners
QIC BioVentures* RedFire Investments
SciVentures Investments Septimus Capital Partners*
Southern Cross Venture Partners Starfish Ventures
Start-up Australia* Stone Ridge Ventures
Technology Venture Partners* Terra Rossa Capital
Trans Tasman Commercialisation Fund Uniquest
Uniseed Yuuwa Capital
* Denotes no funds raised since 2002
Table 4.1: List of domestic VC firms.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of cumulative venture capital by sector.
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A group of investors with significant impact on startup companies but not captured by the data
are the angel investors. Angels are a broadly defined class of private investors, ranging from the
individual high net worth investor to the somewhat more structured angel investment syndicate
such as Melbourne Angels Inc. Many of these angels are not professional investors, but make
investments outside of their day jobs, such as family and friends of business owners. Given
the broad classification of angel investors and the fact that they do not generally disclose their
activities, the amount of capital this group provides in aggregate is unclear. However, Axiss
Australia (2002) estimates the amount of angel financing in Australia to be around a quarter of
all venture capital available.
Angels do not typically compete head on with VC firms for investments, as their investment
ranges are usually less than A$1 million (Axiss Australia, 2002) and they often provide pre-seed
financing, partly by virtue of their lower investment sizes. Since they invest their own capital,
angel investors do not face some of the fund raising challenges that VC firms currently face,
which will be discussed in Section 4.3. Nonetheless, the angel investment scene has challenges
of its own. One angel investor interviewed described the Australian angel community as too
fragmented, the result being there are "too many investors chasing too few good deals".
4.2.2 Industry activity
The venture capital industry has been in decline in the recent years since the height of the global
financial crisis hit in 2008. Levels of recent investment activity are captured in Figure 4.6, which
shows total dollars invested and the corresponding number of investee companies, by year. Since
the peak of 2007, the amount of invested capital has been steadily decreasing, to a low of A$190
million in 2011. Interestingly, the chart also shows that the number of companies receiving
investments has been on an almost continual decline since the technology bubble.
A comparison between countries indicates that investment activity in Australia has taken a more
substantial decline in recent years, relative to several other countries with established venture
capital industries. Figure 4.7 shows annual venture capital investments in the United States
and Australia over the past five years. beginning in 2007 just prior to the global financial crisis.
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This chart is plotted on a logarithmic scale given the orders of magnitude difference between
the two countries. During this time frame, investment activity in the US declined significantly
in 2008 and 2009, but has been climbing slowly since, with total investments in 2011 at about
two-thirds of 2007 levels. In contrast, investment activity in Australia has been on a continuous
decline every year since 2007, and by 2011 it had fallen by half.
Figure 4.8 makes the same comparison of investment activity over the past five years with the
United Kingdom, China, and Ireland. In the UK, investments declined every year until 2010, but
in 2011 it shot up dramatically, recovering to 90% of 2007 investment levels. The experience in
China has been more unique. While venture capital investing has decreased in other countries,
it has increased significantly in China, with total investing in 2011 being 2.7 times that of 2007.
On the other hand, the level of investment decline in Ireland has been similar to Australia-
with the exception of a surge of activity in 2010, total investments in 2011 was half the level of
2007.
While Figures 4.7 and 4.8 compare total investments in absolute terms, Figure 4.9 charts the
trend of total investments per capita.4 The relative results are similar to the previous compar-
isons, with per capita investment showing signs of recovery in the US and the UK, but on a
4 Investment normalized by each country's population in 2010 as reported by the World Bank.
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steady decline in Australia. Not surprisingly, per capita investment in the US is significantly
higher than other countries and more than five times that of Australia. Levels of per capita
investment in Ireland have generally been at least as much as Australia if not higher, whereas in
China the enormous population makes its per capita investment too small to be meaningful on
this chart. Finally, Figure 4.10 shows the most recent levels of VC investment per capita across
a range of countries as at 2011. Although the level of investment in Australia is respectable
relative to other developed countries-such as Germany, Singapore, and New Zealand-it still
lags significantly behind countries like Israel, Canada, and Hong Kong.
VC firms in Australia have been struggling to raise new funds, as well as having difficulty exiting
existing funds, and investment activity has been depressed. One VC investor captured the feeling
when he remarked that it is "extremely difficult, if not impossible, to raise funds" in the current
environment. Figure 4.2 showed the number of new funds raised decreasing over the past three
years, to three funds in 2011. Total funds raised in 2011 experienced a spike to A$249 million,
however this was predominantly the impact of just one firm, Southern Cross Venture Partners
(SCVP), with their 2011 vintage Renewable Energy Fund of A$200 million.
AVCAL (2011) reports lower figures in 2011 than those obtained through Thomson ONE. It
claims that only A$120 million was raised in 2011 and that this was the lowest level of fund
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raising since the technology bust, representing four years of consecutive decline. Differences in
reported figures may be largely attributed to different interpretations of the fiscal year, where
AVCAL defines 2011 as the Australian fiscal year beginning in July 1, 2010 and ending on June
30, 2011. Nonetheless, AVCAL also reports that only three firms were able to raise new capital in
2011. Furthermore, the Australian Government was responsible for propping up this fund raising
by being the major investor, contributing half of all capital raised, including A$100 million to
the SCVP Renewable Energy Fund. These contributions were made through the Government's
Innovation Investment Fund (IIF) program, which requires each dollar of government investment
to be matched by a dollar of private investment. This program, along with other government
initiatives, will be discussed further in Section 4.2.4. Government support has clearly played an
essential role in sustaining the industry recently, without which it would likely have dwindled
significantly.
4.2.3 Industry performance
Each year, AVCAL releases its annual benchmark index, showing the data on pooled returns to
private equity and venture capital in Australia. Unfortunately, after 2008 the association ceased
disclosing the benchmark index specifically for venture capital and only shares the information
with member VC firms. There are a couple of possible reasons why the information has since
been withheld. Firstly, 2008 coincided with the global financial crisis, after which it is likely
that many investee companies in VC portfolios suffered, resulting in poor overall performance.
Since venture capital and private equity performance figures are self-reported, many GPs may
choose not to release their results. For the few companies that do share their performance, the
sample size may be too small obscure their identities in the aggregate figures. Secondly, and
related to the first, poor results are not helpful in advocating an industry. Despite this, it is still
possible to achieve an understanding of the general performance of venture capital investments
in Australia by looking at the indicative data leading up to 2008. However, we note that the
AVCAL recently began a strategic partnership with Cambridge Associates to obtain industry
performance data, and so performance figures captured by their new database could be markedly
different.
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Stage Avg Pooled Upper Median Lower
Venture Capital -5.4 -1.4 3.3 -0.6 -14.8
Private Equity 5.8 9.9 14.4 5.4 -2.5
Table 4.2: Cumulative annualized IRR since inception.
Table 4.2 shows the cumulative performance since inception of both venture capital and private
equity as of June 30, 2008, as reported by AVCAL that year (AVCAL, 2008). Venture capital
yielded overall negative IRRs in aggregate, with a pooled return of -1.4% and average return of
-5.4%. The worst performing quartile of funds had a cumulative IRR of -14.8% while the best
performing quartile managed to achieve a positive return of 3.3%. Swensen (2008) suggests that
for alternative assets like venture capital, it is only worthwhile investing in the top quartile of
fund managers. The question is whether the positive return of 3.3% in 2008 was indeed a good
rate of return.
To benchmark the performance of venture capital, we make a comparison against the All Ordi-
naries index (symbol XAO). The All Ordinaries is a market-capitalization weighted index of the
500 largest companies listed on the ASX, and is a commonly used benchmark for both index
and active fund managers. Table 4.3 shows the overall VC fund horizon returns across one,
three, five, and ten years as reported by AVCAL in 2008, and compares this to the compounded
annual returns one would have achieved by investing in a passive portfolio indexed to the All
Ordinaries.
The data show that VC returns fell far short of stock market returns at the three, five, and ten
year horizons. A passive ten year investment in the All Ordinaries index would have earned a
compounded annual return of 7.1% instead of a loss-making -1.4% in venture capital. At the
one year horizon, VC returns appear to exceed stock market returns. However, a couple of key
factors need to be considered in interpreting this difference.
* The reported VC return should incorporate an adjustment for the risk and illiquidity of
investing in venture capital. Cochrane (2005) points out that discount rates applied to
VC investments range from 35% to 50%, which suggests a risk premium of at least 30%
over the market. Also, Damodaran (2005) finds that the historical illiquidity discount for
venture capital is around 4%.
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Asset class 1 Yr 3 Yr 5 Yr 10 Yr
Venture Capital -0.6 2.7 3.9 -1.4
All Ordinaries -15.3 8.1 12.1 7.1
Table 4.3: Comparison of VC performance against public stocks.
* A one year horizon IRR is not particularly meaningful for a VC fund, which normally
has a life of ten years. The one year IRR would vary enormously depending on the stage
of the fund's life cycle. Also, as discussed by Hardymon et al. (2011), since the assets
are private and illiquid, they are infrequently marked to market value and even then only
under certain conditions.
The general underperformance can also be observed when comparing the cumulative performance
of top quartile VC funds, at 3.3%, against investing passively in the stock market. Investing
in the All Ordinaries at a time horizon beginning in 1986, the inception year used by AVCAL
for its calculations, would have produced a compounded annual return of 7.25%, more than
double top quartile VC returns even before adjusting for risk and illiquidity. This does not
suggest that all VC funds have been underperforming. It is most likely that within this top
quartile stood a select few VC funds achieving superior performance. For example, in 2011, GBS
Ventures reported that its 1998 vintage life science venture capital fund exceeded top quartile
performance metrics, relative even to its peers in the United States (GBS, 2011), although the
actual return was not disclosed.
While AVCAL stopped revealing specific performance data for venture capital after 2008, we
can reasonably hypothesize that it is likely the cumulative returns to 2011 still underperform
stock benchmarks, based on the following deduction. With a ten year horizon return of -1.4%,
overall fund performance in years 2009 to 2011 would need to exceed 25.7% to at least match
the absolute return of the All Ordinaries index for the 13 year period from 1998 to 2011, before
accounting for added risk and illiquidity. It is unlikely that such a sudden and drastic increase
would have occurred after the frenzy of capital withdrawals and flight to quality caused by the
global financial crisis. The results also suggest why AVCAL might choose to pool the data in
aggregate with private equity fund performance given the much stronger performance of PE5 as
"While later-stage private equity performance is outside the scope of this research. we note that a pooled IRR
for VC and PE would greatly danpen any influence of VC performance in the aggregated data since the total
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shown in Table 4.2.
4.2.4 Government support
To the credit of the Australian Government, a number of programs to support the venture
capital industry have been implemented in the years following the Government's launch of the
MIC program in 1984. Since that time, programs like MIC have been updated and replaced, and
other additional programs have been introduced. The Government initiatives currently active
are presented here.
Pooled Development Funds
This program allows VC funds to register with the Government as a Pooled Development Fund
(PDF). Registered PDFs and their shareholders are entitled to tax benefits including a reduced
taxation rate of 15% on income and gains derived from equity investments, as well as tax
exemption on income and gains derived from PDF shares. One of the criteria for PDF eligibility
is that the total assets of each company invested must not exceed A$50 million. The program is
no longer accepting registrations from new funds but companies seeking funding are still eligible
to receive funding from existing PDFs.
Early Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnership
The Early Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnership (ESVCLP) is a newer program that
replaces the PDF program for new funds seeking to register with the Government for favorable
tax treatment. It was introduced in 2002 with the aim of stimulating early-stage investments. A
VC fund registered as an ESVCLP is not treated as a taxing point and its investors are exempt
from taxation on income and capital gains. One of the criteria for ESVCLP eligibility is that the
VC fund must have committed capital of no less than A$10 million and not exceeding A$100
million. Like the PDF program, total assets of companies invested must be less than A$50
level of PE investment is much larger.
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million. Adventure Capital is one of the newer VC partnerships based in Melbourne registered
as an ESVCLP.
Innovation Investment Fund
Through the IIF, the Australian Government invests capital directly into VC funds with a
focus on early-stage companies commercializing research and development. One of the main
requirements is that the IIF investment be matched one-to-one with privately sourced capital.
As long as IIF criteria are met, the Government allows VC managers to retain all decision-making
power, and requires just a 10% share of profits after all capital plus interest 6 has been returned
to investors, leaving the remaining 90% to be shared amongst private LPs and GPs.
According to Auslndustry, the division responsible for the IIF, the program has licensed 16
VC firms and invested in over 100 companies since its inception in 1998 with A$644 million in
committed capital. Round 3 of the IIF began 2007 and is now investing its fourth and final
tranche. As this final round comes to an end, concerns have been expressed amongst players
about the future of the industry, with Woodthorpe (2012) commenting, "(w)orryingly, there is
no appetite from the Government to extend (the IIF) in any form... leaving the massive taxpayer
funded expenditure into R&D without any adequate commercialisation mechanism."
Pre-Seed Fund
Like the lIF, the Pre-Seed Fund (PSF) offered capital commitments from the Government,
but with a focus on commercialization of public sector research from universities and national
research agencies. Only four VC firms7 were selected to invest for the PSF when it launched
in 2002. Of the A$100 million of capital in the PSF, the Government provided A$72.7 million.
The fund is now closed and no longer accepting applications.
6 The hurdle rate stipulated by the IIF is the 10 year bond rate.
7 The four firms were Allen & Buckeridge, GBS Venture Partners, SciVentures, and StarFish Ventures.
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Commercialisation Australia
Commercialisation Australia (CA) is an assistance program offering a variety of funding com-
ponents directly entrepreneurs and researchers to assist with commercialization efforts. Funds
are provided for a variety of purposes including training, experienced executive hires, proof of
concept, and early-stage commercialization. With the exception of training, funding is usually
provided at a ratio of 50% contribution by the Government. The program also offers the assis-
tance of business mentors to provide advice and networking opportunities. Although this does
not relate directly to VC fund raising, it is listed here as having the potential to increase the
opportunity set available to VC firms. On the other hand, it could also help new companies to
get off the ground without the need for venture capital, which carries its own benefits.
Venture capital tax concession
The venture capital tax concession was implemented through the Australian Taxation Office
(ATO) to encourage foreign direct investment in venture capital. It offers tax exemptions from
capital gains made on venture capital investments by foreign investors, including foreign pension
funds and VC fund-of-funds, from certain countries. This concession was not originally designed
to offer exemptions to Australian residents, but was extended in 2002 to allow exemptions to
the partners of the ESVCLP program discussed earlier.
Research and Development Tax Incentive
,Jointly administered by AusIndustry and the ATO, the Research and Development (R&D) Tax
Incentive offers generous tax offsets for R&D activities and expenses to eligible R&D entities.
According to AusIndustry (2011), the incentive provides:
" A 45% refundable tax offset to eligible entities with a turnover of less than A$20 million
annually, provided they are not controlled by income tax exempt entities.
" A 40% non-refundable tax offset for all other eligible entities, with unused non-refundable
offset amounts permitted to be carried forward to future income years.
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Unlike those government initiatives aimed at supporting commercialization or direct venture
capital investments, the aim of this program is to incentivize companies to engage in R&D that
they might not otherwise have conducted.
State government support
Whilst the major support programs are offered by the Federal Government, several smaller
and more localized initiatives are also offered at the individual state level. As an example,
the Government of Western Australia created its Innovation Centre, located in Technology
Park beside the main campus of Curtin University, with the purpose of providing a range of
advisory services and infrastructure to assist local companies with commercialization efforts.
Another example is the support of the state governments of Victoria and South Australia, in
conjunction with the New Zealand Government and the Auckland City Council, in the Trans
Tasman Commercialisation Fund (TTCF). The TTCF is a A$30 million fund, sponsored by
pension fund AustralianSuper, that aims to commercialize technology research and development
from its member universities in Australia and New Zealand. 8
4.2.5 Research in Australian universities
Australia possesses a strong research capability that is competitive on a world scale. In a study
commissioned by the Australian Research Council in 2010, Australia's research was found to be
"well above world standard" in the areas of classical physics, aerospace engineering, environ-
mental technology, and industrial technology. It was also found to be "above world standard"
in the medical science areas of cardiovascular medicine and hemotology, immunology, medical
physiology, oncology and carcinogenesis (ARC, 2010). Figure 4.11 compares the research inten-
sity among several nations, presented in a report by the OECD (2011). Each country on the
chart is represented by a bubble, where the size of the bubble corresponds to R&D volume in
US dollars. The horizontal axis represents R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and the
vertical axis represents the number of researchers per thousand persons employed. Australia's
8 Current member universities are The University of Adelaide (SA), Flinders University (VIC), University of
South Australia (SA), Monash University (VIC), and The University of Auckland (NZ).
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Figure 4.11: R&D in OECD and non-OECD economies. (OECD, 2011)
research intensity can be seen to be on par with, or better than, most developed nations in
terms of both expenditure and researchers employed, although it lags behind several countries
including Finland, Japan, Sweden, Korea, Israel, and the United States.
The Group of Eight (Go8) and the Australian Technology Network (ATN) represent two groups
of the most research-intensive universities that are critical to the nation's intellectual output and
entrepreneurial ecosystem. 9 Tables 4.4 and 4.5 list the universities in each group, and Figure
4.12 shows the geographic distribution of these universities by state. The distribution pattern is
9 Refer to Chapter 5 for a more in-depth discussion of the entrepreneurial ecosystem.
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The Group of Eight
Australian National University
University of Adelaide
University of Melbourne
Monash University
University of New South Wales
University of Queensland
University of Sydney
University of Western Australia
Table 4.4: Member universities of the Group of Eight.
Australian Technology Network
Curtin University of Technology
Queensland University of Technology
RMIT University
University of South Australia
University of Technology Sydney
Table 4.5: Member universities of the Australian Technology Network.
similar that of the geographic distribution of Australian VC firms as shown in Figure 4.4, with
Sydney and Melbourne containing the largest concentration of both research institutions and
VC firms. Figure 4.13 shows the distribution of university research spending by state10 in 2009
following this trend also.
The research-intensive Australian universities recognize the importance of creating an entrepreneurial
environment and providing the resources to commercialize research outcomes, and achieve this
in several ways:
1. University incubators and innovation hubs-such as ThincLab at the University of Ade-
laide, Macquarie Technology Business Incubator at Macquarie University, and Technology
Park at Curtin University-act as a junction for collaboration between the private and
public sector with the universities for the commercial application of research, and are
within close geographic proximity to their respective universities to maintain easy access
to research labs and academics.
2. Events like the Melbourne University Entrepreneurs Challenge, ZEN eChallenge at the
1 0Note that Sydney and M\elbourne are the capital cities of New South Wales and Melbourne, respectively,
which account for over half the university research spending in Australia.
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2010).
University of Adelaide, and the RMIT Business Plan Competition create buzz with both
students and researchers about the myriad of possibilities around new business ideas, and
promote the overall entrepreneurial environment.
3. Programs in innovation and entrepreneurship are now being offered by many universities.
These help to raise awareness and build competency in managing innovations, which are
valuable to both research institutions and businesses. Examples of such programs include
the Master of Technology and Innovation Management at the University of Queensland,
and the Master of Commerce in Strategy and Innovation at the University of Sydney.
4. Several universities possess entities dedicated to the commercialization of in-house research.
These include Melbourne Ventures by the University of Melbourne and New South Innova-
tions by the University of New South Wales. Many of these entities have also formed joint
ventures with each other, each contributing a share of funding along with the Australian
Government and private sector investors, to jointly commercialize research outcomes. The
TTCF, Uniseed' 1 , and UniQuest12 are examples of the major joint venture groups.
However, despite the emphasis on research and the value placed on innovation, Australian uni-
versities still face difficulties in achieving commercial outcomes due to a gap between research
and commercialization. Some of the issues contributing to this gap are incentive misalignments
within the institutions and, in some cases, an insufficient level of financial and professional re-
sources for researchers. This will be further discussed in Section 4.3.3. and ways to address this
issue will be presented in Chapter 5.
4.3 Industry challenges
As presented in Section 4.2, venture capital firms in Australia have struggled to raise funds since
the height of the global financial crisis, with both fund raising and investment activity on the
decline over the past four years. Recent fund raising has been buoyed primarily by IF support,
but this program is now nearing the end of its life cycle. The Government itself acknowledged
"M\ember universities are the Universities of Melbourne, Queensland, and New South Wales.
1 2 Member universities include the Universities of Queensland, Wollongong, and Tasmania.
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that "the IIF, as currently structured, may not be as effective during a time of global recession
and highly restricted access to venture capital." (House of Representatives, 2010)
The risk to the industry is that its downward trend will continue, continuing to make capital
even harder to raise and causing the industry to become anemic, widening the gap between
innovation and commercialization. Moreover, VC funds need to meet a minimum fund size in
order to earn sufficient enough management fees to sustain its GPs and operating costs. The
difficult fund raising environment means some VC firms will struggle to survive.
As shown in Section 4.2.2 the decline is not unique to Australia. Global economic challenges have
impacted the industry in other countries of the world. However, the global economic climate can
only explain part of this decline-Australia continued to experience positive economic growth
throughout the crisis, buoyed by the strong demand for resources from its trading partners,
and yet investment activity has continued to fall while in countries like the US and the UK it
has been making its recovery. There exists a host of causes to the difficult fund raising and
investment environment that are specific to Australia. Our objective is to understand those
causes in order to facilitate specific recommendations that will address them and reverse this
trend.
4.3.1 Unfavorable track record of returns
It is widely known and discussed in research such as Goetzmann & Peles (1995) that investors
tend to select their investments based on past performance, preferring to invest in fund managers,
asset classes, or stocks that have recently performed well, despite the fact that past results are
not a guarantee of future performance. One explanation for this is that investors are rational
but have limited alternative information to rely upon to predict expected outcomes.
Another explanation is the effect of two particular human biases on investors known as the rep-
resentative heuristic and the availability heuristic (Mitchell & Utkus, 2003). The representative
heuristic is the tendency for people to impose some explanatory structure around random data.
The availability heuristic is the tendency for people to rely on information that is most readily
available when making difficult decisions. Both biases can lead investors to rely on performance
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data when making investment decisions.
In Section 4.2.3, it was shown that VC returns have fared rather poorly over the years. The
undesirable impact of this poor performance is its deterrence to potential new investors from
wanting to invest, and its deterrence to existing investors who have experienced bad returns
from wanting to participate in the future rounds of fund raising. With the exception of perhaps
the very few top VC firms, the inferior returns to venture capital in Australia suggests it will
continue to be hard to attract new capital and raises the difficulties for VC firms trying to raise
follow-on funds and convince investors to participate.
As earlier indicated by the trend of fund raising and investment in Figures 4.2 and 4.6 respec-
tively, the highest amount of fund raising and investment in Australian venture capital history
occurred at the peak of the technology bubble. The implication of this is that an enormous
amount of capital was invested at a time when companies were most overvalued, right before
the ensuing crash saw the worth of the very same companies tumble. Excessive valuations would
lead to a poor overall IRR observed in the following years, in both funds that have since closed,
as well as in current funds that began during the bubble.
Further exacerbating the problem is the difficulty GPs now face in exiting their investments
and ending their funds. As explained in Chapter 2, the expected life cycle of a closed-end VC
fund is ten years to harvest all returns. If the fund cannot be fully exited in that time frame,
the GP may have the option to extend this, depending on the terms of contract with the LPs.
In Australia, it is not unusual for GPs to have the option to extend the fund for an additional
two years at a time, up to a maximum of four years. However, GPs prefer to avoid the need to
exercise this option due to the significant costs that it imposes. Firstly, extending a fund reduces
its IRR by taking longer to harvest the returns, giving the firm a poorer track record when it
tries to raise its next fund. Secondly, it imposes reputational costs on the firm by signaling the
firm's inability to exit its investments in a timely enough fashion.
One of the potential reasons GPs are currently struggling to fully exit their funds is that they
still contain sub-optimal portfolio companies, invested in during the internet bubble, that are
difficult to sell. Other possible causes are the weak IPO market (AVCAL, 2011) and the general
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slowdown in economic activity making it difficult for companies to find strategic buyers.
Unfortunately for the industry, the fact that the second surge in fund raising activity occurred
in the lead up to the global financial crisis means the general underperformance of venture
capital returns as a whole may continue for several more years to come. As one VC manager
described, in the short history since venture capital really began to take off in the late 1990s, the
industry experienced two crashes, each occurring just as investors began to regain confidence,
and "leaving them with permanent scars ever since".
4.3.2 Institutional investors
The major institutional investors in Australia include superannuation funds, life insurance offices,
and public unit trusts. Superannuation funds (also known as 'super funds') are the Australian
pension funds, the behemoths of the investment management landscape, controlling A$1.2 tril-
lion out of the country's A$1.7 trillion investment fund asset pool in 2009 (AusTrade, 2010).
These funds are therefore an extremely important source of capital to fund managers in Australia.
Yet while the superannuation finds control enormous amounts of capital, the concern amongst
VC managers is that "virtual(ly) none of this money is flowing to venture capital" (Thomson,
2011). This does not to imply that superannuation funds have contributed nothing to venture
capital - the TTCF's backing by AustralianSuper and Uniseed's backing by Westscheme are
examples of such investments - but that the level of investment has been too little.
The House of Representatives (2007) Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public
Administration stated in its report:
The reason for the limited involvement of superannuation funds in venture capital is not
clear. It may just be that the returns offered by venture capital are inadequate, or it may
be that superannuation fund managers are being unduly 'conservative' in their investment
practices.
While the Government does not claim to have the exact answer why superannuation funds
are not attracted to venture capital, the inadequate returns offered by the industry, which we
demonstrated in Section 4.2.3, is indeed a legitimate explanation why investors would choose
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to avoid it and one that has been cited by VC managers. There is also the behavioral aspect
of gatekeepers 13 and investment managers in the institutional funds who might choose to avoid
the reputational risk of making a recommendation to invest in a high risk asset class with
a poor track record, only to have it continue to underperform. However, we argue that the
Government's suggestion that superannuation funds are being conservative in their approach
is a less plausible explanation, based on the enormous size of these funds. This argument also
applies to other major institutional investors.
Figure 4.2 shows that A$249 million of venture capital funds were raised in 2011, of which half
was provided by the Government. Had this entire funding been provided by superannuation
funds, it would have represented only 0.021% of the industry's total assets. Even if this fund-
ing was provided exclusively by a single superannuation fund such as State Super, one of the
largest funds with over $30 billion in assets under management (State Super, 2012), it would
have represented a mere 0.83% of the fund's total assets under management. It is therefore
unlikely that superannuation funds are being conservative and avoiding the riskiness of venture
capital investing when the impact of such a minute allocation to their portfolios is essentially
negligible.
The real problem is that the large disparity between a venture capital allocation and the size
of a superannuation fund creates a disincentive for the fund manager. Before an investment
decision can be made, considerable effort is expended including a review of the opportunity set,
triage, due diligence, modeling and evaluation, and approvals. Once the investment is made, it
needs to be monitored, reviewed, and reported on a regular basis. Rationally, fund managers
would choose to avoid this amount of effort on an asset class with such a tiny proportion of total
fund size that its impact would not be meaningful. As Katherine Woodthorpe from AVCAL
once stated, "the bigger the superannuation funds get, the harder it is to write a small cheque.
Even the ones that want to invest in VC find it hard to do so." (Thomson, 2011)
The wide disparity between fund sizes stem from structural roots and it continues to grow.
Firstly, by nature of investing in very early stage companies, venture capital investment sizes
are relatively small and typically only in the order of several million dollars, unlike its private
1 3 Gatekeepers are the investment advisors to the fund. They can be in-house or externally hired consultants.
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equity counterpart. Secondly, on the other side of the equation, superannuation funds continue
to grow in part through the Government's mandate of compulsory contribution of 9% of employee
income. Moreover, this contribution is likely to increase to 12% by the year 2020 if a currently
proposed law to increase compulsory contributions is passed agreed by Parliament (ATO, 2012).
As this gap widens, we might expect to see some VC firms try to move into late stage investments
and compete with their PE counterparts to attract institutional capital, but at the risk of lacking
the core competencies to be successful in this space.
4.3.3 Research and commercialization gap
In 2005, the Department of Education, Science and Training commissioned a survey on the
incentives for commercialization of research in Australian universities (DEST, 2005). The key
findings of this survey was that one third of the universities offered "inadequate support and in-
centives to their researchers to get involved in the commercialisation of their research outcomes".
The reasons for this include:
1. Administrative and organizational problems.
2. Inadequate financing and human resources provided by the universities. Some researchers
had to use their own money to the fund initial cost of intellectual property (IP) protection,
even though the university still shared in the upside of a successful venture.
3. A "lack of trust of university administrations to deliver agreed incentives and effectively
implement promotion protocols that were supposed to recognise commercialisation perfor-
mance".
Whilst the research and commercialization gap does not pertain directly to the fund raising
problem facing VC firms, it has important implications to the turnaround and success of the
industry. The ability to better tap into the wealth of innovative ideas at research institutions
and successfully create proofs of concept, business plans, and prototypes, would increase the
opportunity set and deal flow available for venture capital funds, as well as making them more
attractive to investors.
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4.3.4 Industry experience
Since the venture capital industry only really began to emerge in the late 1990s, followed by a
gTeat slowdown in activity thereafter, some VC managers have suggested that, outside the top
tier firms, there are not enough people who have developed the breadth and depth of capability
to be successful in managing VC investments. This leads to poor investment outcomes which
scare away capital further. The poor investment outcomes and lack of funding also result in
missed opportunities for people to become successful entrepreneurs-and it is often the seasoned
and successful entrepreneurs who become the best VC managers. A lagging industry makes it
difficult for firms to attract and retain top talent.
The shortage of experience can also turn away Australian entrepreneurs looking for an edge
from VC investors beyond simple funding. As an example, when Australian software company
Atlassian decided to seek venture capital funding in 2010, it chose Accel Partners, a US venture
capital firm headquartered in Silicon Valley. According to an interview with ZDNet, the co-
founders liked Accel Partners' experience in taking companies public in the US and the more
favorable valuation it offered. But they also did not consider going to Australian VCs, feeling
that "it would be very difficult" with a company of Atlassian's size, and that Accel Partners' level
of expertise "is something that (Australia) just can't match down here." (LeMay, 2010)
Another complaint cited in relation to the relative immaturity of the industry is the lack of
understanding about the venture capital model amongst some investors and decision-makers,
some of whom expect too high a return for the level of risk taken, and others who prefer steer
away from it completely as a result. In either case, Swensen (2008) explains that any investor
who does not take reasonable due diligence in VC fund manager selection or simply gives money
to a fund-of-funds to make the decisions (and charge more fees) is setting up for failure.
4.3.5 Maintaining critical mass for survival
Venture capital firms need to raise minimum fund sizes,14 depending on the size of their opera-
tion, in order to earn enough management fees to sustain their partners, managers, and operating
14 One of the VC managers interviewed suggested that a fund needs to be at least A$65 million to A$85 million.
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costs. The difficult fund raising environment has made it harder to achieve this threshold level
of capital. Moreover, while the percentage of fees charged by GPs in Australia are similar to
that of the United States, these management fees are typically charged on invested capital in-
stead of committed capital (The Senate, 2010), meaning that GPs earn less overall. Finally,
with the exception of the top VC firms, the general underperformance of venture capital has
left negotiating leverage in the hands of LPs, some who are now demanding management fees
cease after the first seven years instead of the standard ten years, leaving those funds needing
to extend their lives at grave risk.
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Chapter 5
Addressing the Industry
Challenges
5.1 A healthy ecosystem of venture capital
A thriving venture capital industry helps to creates a virtuous cycle of growth and success. A
commonly discussed topic in startup circles is the importance of the entrepreneurial ecosystem.
Venture capital fits within this ecosystem as an intermediary, facilitating the growth of the
company by providing finance, expertise, and guidance to investee companies. Figure 5.1 shows
one good representation of such an ecosystem, adapted from a report commissioned by the World
Economic Forum on entrepreneurship education.
A healthy and functioning ecosystem is indeed vital to the survival of venture capital, but this
ecosystem is normally looked at from the perspective of the entrepreneur. To consider ways to
drive venture capital in the economy, we take a venture capital-centric view of the ecosystem.
This is represented in Figure 5.2, which shows the conditional flow of interaction between players
in the ecosystem needed to drive the growth and success of venture capital.
In spite of the fact that Australia is not alone in the current macroeconomic environment, which
sees depressed levels venture capital activity around the world, it faces other unique challenges
of its own. In Chapter 4, we presented how the combination of a lack of funding and inadequate
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Figure 5.1: Entrepreneurial ecosystem, adapted from Volkman et al. (2009).
Increasing the ability to commercialize innovation provides more opportunity for entrepreneurs.
More entrepreneurial opportunities raises the flow of potential investments for venture capital.
[Higher level and quality of investments by venture capital increases long-term returns to the industry.
'Better performing returns raises the profile of the industry and attracts more capital from investors. J
[Success of startup companies inspires and attracts new entrepreneurs spawning new companies.
*Larger pool of skilled and experience entrepreneurs who can become talented VC managers, improving
the competency of VC firms, and support the next wave of entrepreneurs.
Figure 5.2: Venture capital-centric view of the entrepreneurial ecosystem.
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investment returns has plagued the industry, and identified in Section 4.2.3 the major challenges
to turning the situation around. For the remainder of this chapter, we look at how its venture
capital ecosystem is impeded by those challenges, and the ways in which those challenges can
be addressed.
5.2 Bridging the research and commercialization gap
Through their survey of Australian universities on the commercialization of research, the De-
partment of Education, Science and Training (DEST, 2005) found that one third of universities
lacked adequate support and incentive mechanisms to help their researchers commercialize their
work. The key reasons behind this were presented in Section 4.3.3. The report also identified a
list of best practices for universities to incentivize commercialization, summarized below.
1. Strategy and resources. Implement a well-developed and consistent commercialization
strategy and ensure it is recognized and understood by staff.
2. Execution. Set up the procedures, financing, and support mechanisms to facilitate all
stages of business development from IP licensing to commercial deal-making.
3. Financial incentives. Allow researchers to have greater participation in the upside of
commercialization, including revenue sharing (beyond IP licensing royalties) and equity
sharing.
The challenge is for universities to effectively turn these high-level best practices into actionable
steps and measurable outcomes. In addition, the report found that "almost all the universities
had difficulty in making available adequate finance and human resources" to achieve these best
practices. The Pre-Seed Fund is an example of one way in which the Government has helped to
address this problem, however that fund has since closed. Additional government support should
be brought in to address the resource gap at universities. Section 5.5 will present recommended
government support actions.
The objective of the best practices laid out by the DEST was to define how a university can
better incentivize its staff to achieve greater commercialization outcomes within the framework
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of the university's administrative structure. While the alignment of incentives is very important,
it is not the only area through which the research and commercialization gap can be bridged.
Following are several recommendations on other ways the problem can be tackled.
5.2.1 Creative globalization
In an article on the venture capital crisis, Cusumano (2009) argued for "creative globalization",
adding that smaller countries are "usually overlooked by international VC firms, either because
of their size or isolation". This idea has been supported by VC managers in Australia who
believe that in some areas, research institutions lack the critical mass to be competitive on the
world stage. Establishing research collaborations with universities in other small countries, such
as New Zealand and Taiwan, would accrue benefits to all parties. These benefits include:
" Pooling of intellectual capital to increase competitiveness and drive innovation.
* Combining support and financial resources to achieve minimum scale for best practice in
the commercialization of research.
" International mobility for researchers to obtain more skills and experience.
" Gain recognition from the wider international community including VC firms.
" Attract top researchers from other countries.
5.2.2 Increase industry collaboration
The Cooperative Research Centres (CRC) program is a government initiative aimed at promot-
ing partnerships between public research institutions and "end users" of the research outcomes.
These end users can come from the private, public, or community sector, but must be Australian.
According to the CRC Australia website,' there are currently 44 CRCs in operation.
CRCs are a way in which the Government is helping to facilitate research outcomes that have
real applications. However, research institutions need not rely exclusively on winning CRC
grants in order to collaborate with the private sector. Firstly, focusing exclusively on CRCs
1http://www.crc.gov.au/
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misses the opportunity to collaborate with foreign private companies since they are ineligible
from forming CRCs. Secondly, many companies, including Australian firms like CSL Limited,
possess the scale and resources to fund their own research partnerships.
Raising the intensity of collaboration with the private sector helps researchers become more
attentive to market needs in developing new innovations. The best practices described earlier
are important here to provide aligned incentives to researchers, who may be juggling this re-
search with core academic and teaching activities. In return, private companies can provide the
resources, business development skills, and competitive know-how to help commercialize those
innovations.
5.2.3 Training and skills development
One of DEST's recommended best practices is to provide adequate resources to facilitate busi-
ness development. A resource offered by some Australian universities is the service of a business
development manager (BDM), who may be employed in-house or contracted externally. Al-
though the BDM can serve a useful role, it would be valuable to provide researchers with the
training to develop their commercialization knowledge and skills. Part of this can be gained
through the experience of industry collaboration, but this should be supplemented by formal
programs covering areas such as business development and intellectual property.
Researchers with the appropriate training can have a better understanding of the challenges
and pitfalls associated with commercialization, be more aware of the market applicability of
their research, have better interaction with external parties such as lawyers and venture capital
investors, and be more confident and motivated to pursue the commercialization of their research.
To that end, several educational institutions now offer specific programs like the Graduate
Certificate in Commercialisation at the Melbourne Business School.
5.2.4 Innovative partnership structures
Brandon Capital Partners' Medical Research Commercialisation Fund (MRCF) is a good exam-
ple of an innovative structure devised by a VC firm. Established in 2007, this life sciences fund
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runs exclusively for its members, all of whom are medical research institutes owning intellectual
property they are seeking to commercialize. Member institutes of the fund benefit from the
pooling of technology and resources to achieve enough scale for commercialization, while Bran-
don Capital provides advice and support with its highly specialized team of partners including
medical doctors and doctorates in the life sciences. Another unique attribute of the MRCF is
that it is set up as an evergreen fund, meaning it has no deadline for closure, making it suitable
for the pre-seed nature of the investments and the lengthy durations associated with medical
trials.
5.3 Raising the level of capital investment
A healthy flow of innovation and an ability to turn those ideas into startup businesses increases
the quality and the volume of deal flow available to VC firms. This does not necessarily guarantee
better returns to venture capital, as other factors such as the intensity of competition for those
deals, competency level of VC managers, and general market conditions all affect overall returns
to the industry. However, all things being equal, a healthy deal flow is necessary for good returns,
and more investors will be attracted to invest their money by virtue of those improved returns.
This is why a strong ecosystem is the organic remedy to the fund raising problem.
Deal flow and good returns alone are not sufficient to solve the fund raising difficulties in Aus-
tralia. In Chapter 4, one of the major challenges presented is the lack of involvement from
superannuation funds. Even if VC returns are sufficiently attractive, it is simply not practical
for these funds to participate in venture capital as the investible size would represent an almost
negligible proportion of the fund's total portfolio, and its overall impact to the fund's perfor-
mance would not be meaningful. Given the scale of these funds, the effort-to-reward ratio of
managing the additional asset class does not make it worthwhile.
A government policy mandating minimum investments into venture capital by superannuation
funds would be a certain way to ensure participation. It would also solve the risk aversion
problem of the investment advisors and gatekeepers of the superannuation funds, who are now
able to focus on manager selection due diligence instead of worrying about the recently poor
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track record of the asset class. However, a mandate also presents these risks:
" The danger of creating excessive artificial demand for venture capital investments, crowd-
ing out the industry and resulting in overvalued companies as well as investments in bad
companies, as VC firms desperately seek to invest all their committed capital. In a recent
interview, Katherine Woodthorpe of AVCAL suggested a 0.1% allocation of total assets
(Thomson, 2011). This would represent an enormous $1.2 billion of capital, more than
twice the capital raised at the height of the technology bubble. A careful and thorough
evaluation of the investment environment and capital deployment strategy would need to
be considered.
" Since venture capital would be such a miniscule part of the total portfolio, there may
be little regard given to its performance and the quality of investments. This is why it
would be important to ensure sufficient commitment to investment performance, including
evaluations against benchmark returns.
" The Government could be criticized for forcing superannuation finds to violate their fidu-
ciary responsibility to members, by mandating investment into an asset class with a track
record of inadequate returns, which appears to be against the best interests of investors.
A potential way to remedy this problem is not by mandating minimum investments, but for
the superannuation funds to establish a single joint entity with the purpose of managing and
investing a pool of combined capital from each fund. Each superannuation fund can decide
how much to contribute to this pool, and profits from the investment vehicle are distributed
according to each fund's share of committed capital. Tax exemptions on gains and income
should be granted 2 to the entity by giving it flow-through tax treatment, similar to the ESVCLP
described in Section 4.2.4, to offset the impact of 'interfering' with superannuation investment
decisions. The entity should not be restricted to making domestic investments. The would
achieve the following:
o Avoids venture capital flooding the market by having a single entity manage the level of
commitments without forcing superannuation funds to invest more than necessary.
21n superannuation funds. income is generally taxed at 15% and gains exceeding 12 months are taxed at 10%
(Money Smart, 2012).
71
" The entity would be focused exclusively on venture capital investments without being
distracted by the other activities (and assets) of a diversified fund. It would also employ
specialists with expert knowledge of venture capital, instead than generalists.
" The ability to make offshore investments increases the investible size, achieves diversifica-
tion, and allows the superannuation funds to commit larger pools of capital.
As important as they are, superannuation funds do not have to be the primary source of capital
for VC funds. GPs can draw from a variety of investor types, including corporate investors,
endowments, and high net-worth individuals. As the industry evolves, GPs will come up with
more creative ways to attract capital. Brandon Capital Partners' MRCF fund is one example
of this. Whereas the MRCF is set up as an evergreen fund, other VC firms have come up with
'quick execution' business models to address the illiquidity concerns of investors. One strategy
used to achieve this has been rapid investment of committed capital to become fully invested in
three years instead of the standard five years. Another strategy incorporates tailored convertible
instruments to achieve rapid exits when necessary.
Finally, the opportunity to attract capital from foreign investors cannot be ignored, as exem-
plified by Atlassian's US$60 million fund raising from Silicon Valley based Accel Partners in
2010 (Thomson, 2011). The Government has helped to facilitate international investment with
its venture capital tax concession for foreign residents. However, tax concessions alone will not
attract foreign capital if there are no good investment opportunities. A vibrant and successful
entrepreneurial community is important to achieve this, and this is discussed next.
5.4 Fostering entrepreneurial community
Bridging the research and commercialization gap increases the investment opportunity set for VC
firms. However, innovative ideas can come from anywhere and not necessarily out of research
institutions. Building a strong entrepreneurial community to inspire and support the next
generation of entrepreneurs is important for a thriving ecosystem. It also has the added benefit
of providing the talent, for the next generation of capable VC managers.
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Events like SydStart and Melbourne University Entrepreneurs Challenge (MUEC) bring aspiring
entrepreneurs together and offer a breeding ground for ideas and exchange, all while raising the
profile of entrepreneurship through publicity. New events with niche focus like Social Startup
48 (SS48), aimed exclusively at social entrepreneurship, demonstrate the growth of this young
but evolving event scene. VC firms should play an active role in fostering the growth of this
scene through ways including, but not limited to, sponsorship, expert panels, and mentorship.
This greater involvement would reap several rewards:
" Supports a vibrant entrepreneurial community.
" Keeps the VC manager attuned to the dynamic startup scene.
" Provides mutually beneficial network opportunities for VCs and entrepreneurs.
" Raises the profile of the Australian venture capital in the eyes of entrepreneurs, which
could be the difference between companies choosing foreign VC partners over Australian
ones due to a perceived lack of capability (as was the case with Atlassian).
" Opens pipeline of potential deal flow for the VC manager.
One concern shared by VC managers is the lack of business acumen with many young en-
trepreneurs who, understandably, may be starting their first business. These events provide
an opportunity to provide workshops for aspiring entrepreneurs to develop essential skills. A
recent example of this is the Business Development Plan workshop that was offered at the 2012
National Angel Investor Conference in Melbourne.
In 2011, the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) com-
missioned a study by the Centre for the Study of Higher Education (CSHE) at the University of
Melbourne into attitudes of academic staff at higher education institutions (Bexley et al., 2011).
It found that 28.3% of academics "have either a long-term or a short-term intention to move
to an academic position in another country", with the main reason being "dissatisfaction with
income and with job security"'. Addressing this problem is outside the scope of this research,
but a worrying implication of the finding is the risk of 'brain drain, where the intellectual tal-
ent and sources of future innovation are leaving the country, rather than feeding into the local
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entrepreneurial community.
5.5 Government support
In the book, Boulevard of Broken Dreams, Lerner (2009) examines the effectiveness and com-
mon mistakes of public policies aimed at supporting entrepreneurs and venture capitalists by
governments around the world, and offers guidance towards devising effective policies and avoid-
ing common mistakes. Most importantly, he finds that government intervention can play a key
role in stimulating the entrepreneurial ecosystem-which has indeed been true in hubs like Sil-
icon Valley and Tel Aviv-provided the policies are well-conceived from a good understanding
of the entrepreneurial process and in the context of the specific country environment, rather
than simply imitating other countries with cookie cutter policies which often lead to failure. In
this section, we recommend specific actions the Australian Government can take to support the
growth and success of venture capital, against the backdrop of those programs that have already
been implemented.
5.5.1 Take a global view of venture capital
Even if the primary motivation of supporting entrepreneurship and venture capital in the country
is to drive the nation's future economic growth and prosperity, the Government needs to take
a more global perspective with its programs. It is understandable that the Government would
want to ensure that the economic benefits derived from publicly supported initiatives be retained
in Australia, but placing barriers that are too artificially restrictive can end up limiting the
potential upside or, at worst, being counterproductive.
The CRC initiative, which promotes partnerships between public research institutions and "end
users" of the research outcomes, is an example of such a program. By requiring that end users be
an Australian entity, this program denies homegrown innovations the opportunity to tackle the
problems of potential customers abroad in the wider global market. It can be argued that solving
problems for local end users can have global implications, but this does not take away from the
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fact that Australian innovators are restricted to focusing on a small domestic subset of potential
challenges. We recommend that this program be expanded to allow research institutions to
collaborate with an international community of end users. The public successes of such ventures
would also serve to promote Australian research institutions with a global audience.
The ESVCLP program offers favorable tax treatment to licensed funds and their limited partners.
To prevent this program being exploited by foreign firms, a condition was set that required at
least 50% of the invested firm's staff and assets to be located in Australia (AusIndustry, 2012).
Lerner (2009) discovered that this hampered the investee companies of the early funds, as they
were unable to "expand their software development activities in India or their manufacturing
operations in China without putting the venture funds' tax status in danger". Today, this
condition only needs to be satisfied for at least 12 months after the time of investment for at
least 80% of the fund's committed capital. However, the condition can still be an impedance
to firms looking to roll out rapidly or seeking a first mover competitive advantage. For a one
or two person startup that needs to hire even a small team of software engineers abroad, this
condition is easy to violate. Therefore, it makes sense to relax this restriction by eliminating
the staff and assets ratio in favor of ensuring majority ownership by an Australian entity.
By taking more tailored steps to commit to an international focus on entrepreneurship and
venture capital, the Government demonstrates a global ambition that attracts both investors and
corporations from abroad. Cusumano (2005) examines Ireland as a country that has aggressively
pursued this through its Enterprise Ireland organization, with an international office network in
over 30 locations around the world promoting the growth and development of Irish enterprises.
From a broader policy perspective, a key area for the Australian Government to consider is
immigration law to address the skills shortage problem. For example, the most recent skills
shortage report released by the DEEWR showed that only 40% of vacancies in the engineering
profession were filled in 2011 (DEEWR, 2011). Aside from specific skills shortages, facilitating
the inflow of talented labor is a key element in supporting local enterprises and adding to the
pool of intellectual capital.
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5.5.2 Tax considerations
The introduction of the ESVCLP in 2002 and the corresponding venture capital tax concession
was an important recognition of the venture capital partnership structure in Australia by allow-
ing the flow-through tax treatment of these funds. Despite these well-intentioned policies, there
remain aspects of these tax treatments that can be improved for local venture capital. In fact,
recent events involving taxation laws have created an uncertain environment that has negatively
impacted the industry.
The venture capital tax concession was created with the intention of attracting foreign capital.
It was introduced in 1999 to provide exemptions on 'venture capital equity' by specific foreign
pension funds, though this was extended in 2002 to provide exemptions to overseas residents
and fund of funds (ATO, 2012). The ESVCLP tax concession was later incorporated to allow
Australian residents to benefit from the exemptions. In its report Entrepreneurship and Growth:
Tax Issues, the OECD (2002) described this form of taxation as a back-end incentive. The
alternative form of taxation is the front-end incentive, which is an immediate up-front tax
subsidy for the investor. The Australian venture capital tax concession does not offer up-front
subsidies and thus avoids the misalignment of front-end incentives, which the OECD argues
"can cause behaviour motivated primarily by tax shelter considerations". This misalignment
occurs because investors stand to make considerable gains through tax subsidies regardless of
the performance or quality of their investments.
The Australian venture capital tax concession, as a back-end incentive, has limitations of its own
as it does not encourage risk taking. The OECD (2002) finds that since this type of incentive
"rewards only winners or successful investments"', it may "motivate fewer venture investments
overall" since "realising gains is riskier for the investor". Stewart (2005) makes the important
point that since this tax concession only has value if it can be exercised on profitable investments,
it attracts capital towards later stage private equity investments, and away from seed and early-
stage investments which by their very nature are typically unprofitable to begin with.
In addition, Lerner (2009) argues that tax policies need to incentivize the entrepreneur to take
the risk of starting a business (the demand side of venture capital) and not just on attracting
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investors on the supply side, pointing out the lack of evidence to suggest that supply side policies
have any great impact on sophisticated institutional investors. In support of stimulating risk
taking by entrepreneurs through tax policy, Gompers and Lerner (1998) find empirical evidence
to support Poterba (1989) that lower capital gains taxes attract entrepreneurs to start businesses,
since entrepreneurs gain primarily from the appreciation of equity in their companies rather than
through wages or salaries. Thus tax policies, aimed at stimulating entrepreneurs, indirectly
increase the flow of venture capital by increasing the pool of startup businesses.
Unfortunately, Australian tax policies covering small business entity concessions offer little relief
to startup entrepreneurs. For example, a full capital gains tax exemption is only possible for
assets that have been held for at least 15 years, an unrealistic requirement for startups. Failing
to satisfy this criteria, the small business may be eligible for a 50% reduction in capital gains
tax for a subclass of assets if other criteria are satisfied (ATO, 2011). These tax policies need
to be amended to offer more incentive to entrepreneurs to undertake high risk startup ventures,
by giving full capital gains exemptions to eligible startups, or allowing entrepreneurs to carry
their operating losses forward so that future income can be offset by past losses.
Another issue with taxation policies is the uncertain investment environment it has created in
recent years. In 2009, the Government caused controversy (Thomson, 2009) when it introduced
changes to its rules governing employee share schemes (ESS). The changes require employees to
pay taxes up-front on shares received from their company if it deems those shares to have been
issued at a discount (ATO, 2010). While the motivating factor behind this policy is to target
corporate executives that engineer share schemes to avoid taxes, it has the undesired effect of
taking down entrepreneurs and startup employees as casualties, who rely primarily on equity
ownership and appreciation as a major incentive. It also deters angel investors, who make the
initial high risk investment in startups in exchange for share ownership while receiving little
other incentives. Conditions of exception should be made to exclude employees of developing
stage companies.
Other controversial incidents have been the Government's dispute with US private equity firm
TPG over an interpretation of tax treatment to profits earned through its sale of national de-
partment store Myer (Dealbook, 2010), and the Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT) proposed
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by the Labour Government (Packham and Massola, 2012). Until they are resolved, taxation
issues like these can impact the venture capital industry indirectly by creating an uncertain
environment that deters foreign investment. Additionally, the same foreign investors in private
equity who hold back or withdraw capital from Australia could have been potential investors in
venture capital, resulting in missed investment opportunities for the industry. It is important
that the Government maintains clarity and transparency around its regulations to avoid creating
such a climate of uncertainty.
5.5.3 Managing publicly funded investment pools
As discussed in Chapter 4, the IIF is now investing the last tranche of its final round, and the
Government has not shown any desire to extend the program or introduce a new publicly funded
venture capital investment pool, a situation which has worried industry players. Government
funds like the IIF can play a helpful role in stimulating venture capital activity provided they
are well conceived and designed. One of the positive aspects of the IIF is that it allows the VC
manager to make all investment decisions, thus leaving the decision making power in the hands
of the private investors who are better suited to make those calls.
The 1IF, or a similar public investment pool, should continue to play a part in the struggling
venture capital industry in Australia. This does not mean it should continue exactly in its current
form. Indeed, there are areas in which the fund can be reformed to better achieve its objective
of stimulating investment activity. An area of reform would be to improve the process by which
recipient VC managers are selected and their investment performance managed. Implementing
policies to ensure that VC managers have an incentive to achieve good investment outcomes,
beyond earning management fees, can be a powerful way to align incentives if combined with
mechanisms to monitor portfolio performance on a regular basis. In doing so, the Government
should provide an appropriate level of training to public servants to build their competency and
understanding of venture capital investing, in order to adequately carry out their duties.
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5.5.4 Supporting the ecosystem
Governments at both the state and federal level do have the ability to stimulate entrepreneurship
and venture capital through public initiatives. Programs like Commercialisation Australia, the
Trans Tasman Commercialisation Fund, and the WA Innovation Centre offer examples of the
Australian Government's commitment to supporting business and innovation in the country.
Like any program, it is important that the Government measure the success of these programs'
outcomes and iterate accordingly. Moreover, programs should not simply be replicated from
elsewhere, but should be considered in the context of the local environment. For example,
Cusumano (2009) points out that while incubators often do poorly, they may be helpful in some
markets where the supply of venture funding is limited.
Lerner (2009) highlights Australia's Building on Information Technology Strengths (BITS) pro-
gram as an example of a government program supporting entrepreneurship with sub-optimal
outcomes. The BITS program, which was introduced in 1999, led to the establishment of 11
incubators around Australia supporting small businesses in the IT sector. However, it was later
found that "at the typical incubator, most of funding went to the incubator managers themselves,
in order to compensate them for management advice and other services to the entrepreneurial
firms" and startups were "actually limited in their ability to shop for the best service providers"
and "forced by the incubators to use the in-house counsel". On the other hand, those incubators
that had the most successful firms, such as InQbator and BlueFire, provided the bulk of funding
to their startup companies and "were more willing than the others to allow incubatees to obtain
professional services from elsewhere". This experience illustrates the importance of carefully
aligned incentives and a focus on outcomes.
With the right focus on outcomes, there are numerous ways the Government can continue to
support the entrepreneurial ecosystem, including offering resources to help research institutions
achieve best practices in commercialization, introducing entrepreneurship into the education
system, and attracting private sector investment into the establishment of research centers.
Challenge.gov is an example of an innovative online platform introduced by the US Government
in 2010 that relies on crowd sourcing to solve public sector challenges. While its effectiveness
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remains to be seen, it serves to remind us that even policy makers need to embrace innovation
in order to successfully drive innovation in this fast changing world.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Australia possesses many attributes that make it favorable to a thriving entrepreneurial envi-
ronment and healthy venture capital industry, including well developed capital markets, strong
regulatory and legal frameworks, and world class research institutions. However, as a relatively
young industry, venture capital has not yet been able demonstrate its true potential. Since
the industry first took shape in the late 1990s, it experienced two major crashes just when
large amounts of capital were beginning to flow in. This created two major problems for its
investors. Firstly, since most of the venture capital investments were made during the bubbles,
performance of the funds suffered-even to this day-with many funds still holding investments
made during the technology bubble or investments made just prior to the global financial crisis.
Secondly, during market recessions there is a flight to quality as investors withdraw capital from
risky assets to transfer them to safe assets, such as government bonds. However, the long term
commitment to VC funds means that investors would have been unable to withdraw any capital
when they needed it most, as they were subject to a lock-up period, thus leading to potential
liquidity shortages. Sophisticated investors understand and are prepared for this constraint, but
for a young industry it is likely this was still a major issue for many investors. The overall effect
of both these problems was to scar current investors and deter future investors.
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The curse of youth
While a large part of the inadequate returns in the industry can be attributed to the intense
competition and overvaluations at the fund raising and investment peaks, the industry immatu-
rity is another contributor. Successful VC firms are more than simply financial intermediaries.
If they were, there would be no need for them as banks could take the role as pure capital
providers. To be successful in their trade, VC firms possess value added capabilities and strate-
gies to manage the risks and information asymmetries inherent in private investing. This is
drawn from a variety of sources, including deal sourcing, due diligence, networks, guidance and
support, and a highly qualified team of managers. The sudden availability of capital during the
technology bubble attracted an influx of new entrants eager to capture some of this value. A
good example of this is the now defunct Macquarie Technology Ventures (MTV). Founded in
1998, it raised its $30 million fund in 1999.1 MTV had no venture capital roots. Instead, it was
a small group within the investment banking division of Macquarie Bank's Asset and Infrastruc-
ture group, a group that financed $20 billion of assets in 2001 (Macquarie Bank, 2001). A good
VC practice cannot be created overnight, and the earlier dormancy of the industry meant that
there were few experienced VC managers. As a result, new entrants raised VC funds without
the experience and skills necessary to succeed, hurting both the performance and the reputation
of the industry.
Recommendations
A holistic approach of promoting the venture capital ecosystem is the only way for the industry
to overcome its challenges. This includes driving a thriving entrepreneurial community and
fixing the incentives at research institutions, while improving the accessibility to the resources
needed for commercialization outcomes. A greater willingness from institutional investors to
invest in venture capital is important to provide for and sustain a long term growth of the
industry. However, the structure of this investor group makes this more difficult, as superan-
nuation funds control enormous amounts of capital. Mandating minimum investments would
'Source: Thomson ONE
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not make sense as it would flood the market with capital as well as increase competition for
the few top performing VC funds. A jointly established separate entity to manage a pool of
capital contributed by the superannuation funds, at their discretion, is a potential way to re-
solve this issue without mandating contributions. However, the industry would do better not to
rest its hopes on institutional investors, and place greater emphasis on building and harnessing
relationships with other potential LPs including high net-worth and foreign investors. Finally,
while the Australian Government has made several positive efforts to support the industry, there
are a number of policy areas it needs to address. This includes allowing greater collaboration
with the international community, introducing tax policies that favor entrepreneurs rather than
just back-end incentives, renewing publicly funded investment pools but with a greater focus
on management and performance, and supporting the entrepreneurial ecosystem through ed-
ucation. Given the industry state, the government has a critical role to play in stimulating
and reviving it. Fixing the venture capital ecosystem creates a virtuous cycle of improvement
that becomes self-sustaining, increasing the deal flow for investments, attracting new capital,
improving the quality and talent of managers, and raising the profile of the industry.
83
84
Bibliography
ASX Group, 2012. "History." http://www.asxgroup.com.au/history.htm, accessed March 2012.
Attard, B. "The Economic History of Australia from 1788: An Introduction." Economic
History Association, February 4, 2010. http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/attard.australia,
accessed March 2012.
AusIndustry, 2011. "R&D Tax Incentive." http:
/ /www. ausindustry. gov. au/programs/innovation- rd/RD- TaxIncentive/Pages/default. aspx,
accessed May 2012.
AusIndustry, 2012. "Early Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnerships - Customer Information
Guide."' (PDF file), downloaded from http://www.ausindustry.gov.au/programs/
venture- capital/esvclp/Docuients/ESVCLP- CustomerlnfoGuide.pdf, accessed March 2012.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2010. "8112.0 - Research and Experimental Development, All
Sector Summary, Australia, 2008-09."
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@O.nsf/Lookup/8112.OMain+Features12008-09,
accessed March 2012.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011. "3235.0 - Population by Age and Sex, Regions of
Australia, 2010." http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@O.nsf/inf/3235.0, accessed March
2012.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012. "5678.0 - Venture Capital and Later Stage Private
Equity, Australia, 2010-11." http:
//www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/5678.Main%20Features12010-11,
accessed March 2012.
Australian Geographic. "World Changing Aussie Inventions." Australian Geographic, June 18,
2010.
http://www.australiangeographic.com.au/journal/world-changing-aussie-inventions.htm,
accessed April 2012.
Australian Government, 2012. "The Lucky Country."
http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/australian-story/lucky-country, accessed March
2012.
Australian Research Council, 2010. "Excellence in Research for Australia 2010 - National
Report". (PDF file), downloaded from
http://www.arc.gov.au/era/era 2010/outcomes 2010.htm, accessed March 2012.
85
Australian Taxation Office, 2012. "Employee share schemes (ESS)."
http://www.ato.gov.au/businesses/pathway.aspx?sid=42&ms=businesses&pc=001/003/120/
004/002&menuid=49313&mfp=001, accessed March 2012.
Australian Taxation Office, 2011. "Capital gains tax (CGT) concessions." http://www.ato.gov.
au/businesses/content.aspx?menuid=0&doc=/content/00106318.htm&page= 1&H1, accessed
March 2012.
Australian Taxation Office, 2012. "Venture capital tax concession."
http://www.ato.gov.au/pathway.aspx?sid=42&ms=businesses&pc=001/003/118&mnu=0,
accessed March 2012.
Australian Taxation Office, 2012. "Key superannuation rates and thresholds." http://www.ato.
gov.au/super/content.aspx?menuid=0&doc=/content/60489.htm&page= 19&H19" accessed
March 2012.
Australian Trade Commission, 2010. "Investment Management Industry in Australia." (PDF
file), downloaded from http://www.austrade.gov.au/ArticleDocuments/2792/
Investment-Management-Industry-in-Australia.pdf. aspx, accessed March 2012.
Australian Venture Capital & Private Equity Association Limited, 2008. "Yearbook 2008:
Industry Statistics for the year ended June 30, 2008." (PDF file), downloaded from
http://www.avcal.com.au/documents/item/168, accessed March 2012.
Australian Venture Capital & Private Equity Association Limited, 2009. "Value Capital: The
Evolution of Venture Capital and Private Equity in Australia." (PDF file), downloaded from
http://www.avcal.com.au/documents/item/148, accessed March 2012.
Australian Venture Capital & Private Equity Association Limited, 2011. "2011 Yearbook:
Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Activity Report - November 2011." (PDF
file), downloaded from http://www.avcal.com.au/documents/item/66, accessed March 2012.
Axiss Australia, 2002. "The Australian Venture Capital Industry: Development and Trends."
(PDF file), downloaded from www.altassets.com/pdfs/AxissAustralia.pdf accessed March
2012.
Bexley, E., James, R., and Arkoudis, S. "The Australian academic profession in transition."
(Report) Centre for the Study of Higher Education, September 2011.
http://www.cshe.unimelb.edu.au/people/bexley-docs/TheAcademicProfession in
Transition Sept2011.pdf, accessed March 2012.
CalPERS, 2011. "Understanding Private Equity Performance." http://www.calpers.ca.gov/
index.jsp?bc=/investments/assets/equities/aim/private-equity-review/understanding.xml,
accessed March 2012.
CHAMP Private Equity. "Investment Team."
www.champequity.com.au/investmnent-team/w1/i1001463/, accessed March 2012.
Cochrane, J.H. "The Risk and Return of Venture Capital." (Paper) Graduate School of
Business, University of Chicago, March 19, 2004.
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/venture.pdf, accessed
March 2012.
86
Cusumano, M. "Software in Ireland: A Balance of Entrepreneurship and... Lifestyle
Management?" Communications of the ACM 48, no. 10 (October 2005): 25-27.
Cusumano, M. "Dealing with the Venture Capital Crisis." Communications of the ACM 52, no.
20 (October 2009): 25-27.
Damodaran, A. "Marketability and Value: Measuring the Illiquidity Discount." (Paper) Stern
School of Business, New York University, July 2005.
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/papers/liquidity.pdf, accessed March 2012.
Dealbook. "Schwarzman Sees Buyout 'Chill' in Australia." The New York Times, February 2,
2010. http:
//dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/schwarzman-says-australia-faces-private-equity-chill/,
accessed March 2012.
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, 2011. "Skill Shortages -
Summary." (PDF online), downloaded from http://www.deewr.gov.au/Employment/LMI/
SkillShortages/Documents/SkillShortagesSummary20l1.pdf, accessed March 2012.
Department of Education, Science and Training, 2005. "Evaluation of incentives for
commercialisation of research in Australian universities" (PDF online), downloaded from
http://www.dest.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/47EA81AF-6271-40E9-813F-66F82AD85F2A/4470/
incentives cominercialisationl.pdf, accessed March 2012.
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2011. "Australia's top 25 exports, goods & services"
(PDF online), downloaded from http:
//www.dfat.gov.au/publications/tgs/FY2011 goods services_%20top 25_exports.pdf,
accessed March 2012.
The Economist. "Melbourne Storm."" The Economist, August 30, 2011.
http://www.economist.coin/node/21528162, accessed March 2012.
Economist Intelligence Unit. "Manning the Barricades." (PDF online), downloaded from
http://graphics.eiu.com/specialReport/manning-the-barricades.pdf, accessed March 2012.
Garton, P. "The resources boom and the two-speed economy."' The Treasury, Economic
Roundup, Issue 3 (2008).
http://www.arpc.treasury.gov.au/documents/1421/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=02%2OThe%
20resources%20boom%20and%20the%20two%20speed%20economy.htm, accessed March
2012.
GBS Venture Partners. "GBS Ventures completes healthcare fund with global first quartile
performance." GBS Venture Partners press release, October 17, 2011.
http://www.gbsventures.com.au/news-and-events/
gbs- ventures- completes- healthcare- fund-with-global-first-quartile-performance, accessed
March 2012.
Goetzmann, W.N., and Peles, N. "Cognitive Dissonance and Mutual Fund Investors." The
Journal of Financial Research 20 (1995): 145-158.
Gompers, P.A., "Grandstanding in the venture capital industry."' Journal of Financial
Economics. 42 (1996): 133-156.
87
Gompers, P.A. and Lerner, .1. "What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?" HBS Working
Paper No. 99-079, 1996,
http://www.hbs.edu/research/facpubs/workingpapers/papers2/9899/99- 079.pdf, accessed
March 2012.
Hardymon, F., Lerner, J., and Leamon, A. "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Valuation and
Distribution in Private Equity." HBS No. 9-803-161. Boston: Harvard Business School
Publishing, 2011.
Horne, D. The Lucky Country. Melbourne: Penguin Group Australia, 2009.
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public
Administration, 2007. "Australian manufacturing: today and tomorrow." (PDF file),
downloaded from http://www.aph.gov.au/ParliamentaryBusiness/Committees/House of
Representatives Committees?url /efpa/manufacturing/report /fullrep ort. pdf, accessed
March 2012.
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public
Administration, 2010. "Australian manufacturing: today and tomorrow - Government
Response." (PDF file), downloaded from http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary Business/
Committees/House-of Representatives Committees?url=economics/government%
20responses/manufacturing%20govt%2Oresponse.pdf, accessed March 2012.
LeMay, R. "Atlassian scores US$60m in venture capital." ZDNet, July 15, 2010.
http://www.zdnet.com.au/atlassian-scores--us60-in-in-venture-capital-339304552.htm,
accessed March 2012.
Lerner, J. Boulevard of Broken Dreams. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009.
Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook.
4th ed. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008.
Macquarie Bank. "2001 Annual Review, Asset and Infrastructure Group."
http://www.niacquarie.com.au/aboutus/investor information/ar2001/ass-inf-group.htm,
accessed April 2012.
Mitchell, 0., and Utkus, S. "Lessons from Behavioral Finance for Retirement Plan Design."
Pension Research Council Working Paper No. PRC-WP 2003-6.
Money Smart. "Tax & super." https://www.moneysmart.gov.au/
superannuation-and-retirement/how-super-works/tax-and-super accessed March 2012.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002. "Entrepreneurship and
Growth: Tax Issues." (PDF file), downloaded from
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/19/2079715.pdf, accessed March 2012.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2009. "OECD Science, Technology
and Industry Scoreboard 2009." http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/
oecd- science- technology- and- industry- scoreboard- 2009_sti scoreboard- 2009- en, accessed
April 2012.
88
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011. "OECD Science, Technology
and Industry Scoreboard 2011." http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/
oecd-science-technology-and-industry-scoreboard 20725345, accessed April 2012.
Packham, B. and Massola, J. "Resource tax plan would be a hammer blow to confidence, says
Minerals Council." The Australian, March 30, 2012.
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/
resource- tax- plan- would-be-a-hammer-blow-to-confidence-says-minerals-council/
story-fn59niix- 1226314416902, accessed April 2012.
Porter, M. "The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy." Harvard Business Review
January 2008, Reprint R0801E.
Poterba, J. "Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxation." in: Tax Policy and the Economy.
Cambridge: MIT Press, L.H. Summers, ed. 1988, pp.4 7 -6 8 .
Reserve Bank of Australia. "Graphs on the Australian Economy and Financial Markets."
http://www.rba.gov.au/chart-pack/index.html, accessed March 2012.
The Senate, Standing Committee on Economics, 2010. "Private Equity Investment in
Australia." (PDF file), downloaded from National Library of Australia website.
http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/8215385, accessed March 2012.
Standard and Poors. "S&PASX All Ordinaries." http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/
sp- asx- all- ordinaries/en/us/?indexld =spaustaordaudto- - p-au ---- , accessed March 2012.
State Super. "About the Fund: General Information."
http://www.statesuper.nsw.gov.au/about-generalinfo.htm, accessed March 2012.
Stewart, M. "Venture Capital Taxation in Australia and New Zealand." Intellectual Property
Research Institute of Australia Working Paper No. 02/05, 2005.
littp://www.ipria.org/publications/wp/2005/IPRIAWPO2.2005.pdf, accessed March 2012.
Swensen. D.F., Pioneering Portfolio Management. Revised ed. New York: Free Press, 2009.
Thomson. J. "Unions, venture capitalists join fight against employee share scheme crack-
down." Smart Company, May 20, 2009. http://www.smartcompaiiy.com.au/managing-people/
032875- 20090520-unions-venture-capitalists-join-fight-against-employee-share-scheme-crackdown.
html, accessed March 2012.
Thomson. J. "Superannuation pool hits $1.23 trillion - but where is the cash for venture
capital?" Smart Company, January 20, 2011.
http://www.smartcompany.com.au/superannuation/
20110120-superannuation-pool-hits- 1-23-trillion- but-where-is-the-cash-for-venture-capital.
html, accessed March 2012.
United Nations Development Programme. "Australia Country Profile: Human Development
Indicators." http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AUS.html, accessed March 2012.
Wan, V., "Development of the Venture Capital Market in Australia." University of Wollongong
School of Accounting & Finance Working Paper No. 7, 1988.
http://ro.uow.edu.au/accfinwp/141/ accessed March 2012.
89
Woodthorpe, K. "Venture Capital Vital To Our Nation's Hi-Tech Survival." Corporate
Live Wire, January 20, 2012. http://www.corporatelivewire.com/top-story.html?id= 177,
accessed March 2012.
Volkman, C., Wilson, K.E., Marriotti, S., Rabuzzi, D., Vyakarnam, S., and Sepulveda, A,
2009. "Educating the Next Wave of Entrepreneurs." (PDF file), downloaded from World
Economic Forum website.
https://members.weforum.org/pdf/GEI/2009/EntrepreneurshipEducationReport.pdf,
accessed March 2012.
90
